From 6038234f61aa1360cbf498370c9ef0638ab18cc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: user <303926+HarryR@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2026 11:07:55 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Added alibaba trust client notes

---
 experiments/alibaba/.gitignore                |   4 +
 experiments/alibaba/NOTES.md                  | 552 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../alibaba/alibaba-trust-us-east-1.sh        | 144 +++++
 experiments/alibaba/aliyun-ekmf-ca.crt        |  93 +++
 experiments/alibaba/aliyun-root-ca.crt        |  81 +++
 5 files changed, 874 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 experiments/alibaba/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 experiments/alibaba/NOTES.md
 create mode 100644 experiments/alibaba/alibaba-trust-us-east-1.sh
 create mode 100644 experiments/alibaba/aliyun-ekmf-ca.crt
 create mode 100644 experiments/alibaba/aliyun-root-ca.crt

diff --git a/experiments/alibaba/.gitignore b/experiments/alibaba/.gitignore
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+t-trustclient-extracted
+trustagent-binaryninja
+trustagent-hexrays
+t-trustclient.deb
diff --git a/experiments/alibaba/NOTES.md b/experiments/alibaba/NOTES.md
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+# Alibaba Cloud vTPM Attestation - Research Notes
+
+## Overview
+
+Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun) ECS security-enhanced instances include a vTPM (TPM 2.0 compatible).
+The trust agent (`t-trustclient`) runs on the instance and handles attestation automatically.
+
+## Certificate Chain (EK)
+
+Downloaded from public OSS bucket. Chain verifies cleanly.
+
+```
+Root:         C=CN, O=Aliyun, OU=Aliyun TPM Root CA, CN=Aliyun TPM Root CA
+              RSA 2048, self-signed, sha384WithRSA, valid until 2030
+              URL: https://aliyun-tpm-ca.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/pki001/root-ca.crt
+
+Intermediate: C=CN, O=Aliyun, OU=Aliyun TPM Endorsement Key Manufacture CA, CN=Aliyun TPM EKMF CA
+              RSA 2048, signed by root, sha384WithRSA, valid until 2030
+              URL: https://aliyun-tpm-ca.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/pki001/ekmf-ca.crt
+              CRL: https://aliyun-tpm-ca.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/pki001/root-ca.crl
+```
+
+No AK/AIK certificates found at the OSS bucket (tried various guesses, all 403).
+Bucket listing is access-denied.
+
+## Trust Agent Package
+
+Available from public OSS buckets per region:
+```
+http://trustclient-${REGION_ID}.oss-${REGION_ID}.aliyuncs.com/download/linux/ubuntu/x86_64/${VERSION}/t-trustclient-${VERSION}-x86_64.deb
+```
+
+Current version: 1.1.0 (as of 2026-02-07)
+Available in: cn-beijing, cn-hangzhou, cn-shanghai, us-east-1, ap-southeast-1 (NOT us-west-1)
+
+### Package Contents
+```
+/etc/ali_trust_net.conf                          # config
+/usr/local/bin/trust-agent                       # main binary
+/usr/lib/systemd/system/t-trustclient.service    # systemd unit
+/usr/lib/libtrust.so.1.0.0                       # core trust library
+/usr/lib/libtrust_tpm.so.1.0.0                   # TPM operations
+/usr/lib/libtrust_network.so.1.0.0               # network/API calls (statically linked against libstdc++, libcurl, libssl, etc.)
+/usr/lib/libtpm2-openssl.so.1.0.0                # TPM2 OpenSSL provider
+/usr/lib/libtpm2-tools.so.1.0.0                  # TPM2 tools
+/usr/lib/libtss2-tcti-device.so.1.0.0            # TSS2 TCTI device
+```
+
+Built from: `trustclient-opensource/third_party/ali-trust-sdk/` (source paths in binary)
+Key source files referenced: `tpm_net_api.cpp`, `tpm_pop_visitor.cpp`, `tpm_http_visitor.cpp`
+
+## Configuration (`ali_trust_net.conf`)
+
+Key settings:
+- `REGION_ID` - auto-detected from instance metadata
+- `DEFAULT_SERVICE_ENDPOINT` / `TRUSTED_SERVER_ENDPOINT` - e.g. `trusted-server-vpc.cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com`
+- `QUOTE_SERVER_ENDPOINT` - separate endpoint for quote submission
+- `AIKSS_SERVER_ENDPOINT` - separate endpoint for AIK signing service
+- `POP_ENABLED=TRUE` - use Alibaba Cloud POP API gateway (vs direct HTTP)
+- `HTTP_ENABLED` - for direct HTTP mode (bypasses POP)
+- `INCREMENT_IMA=FALSE` - incremental IMA log submission
+- `ACCESS_KEY` / `ACCESS_SECRET` - for classic credential mode
+
+## Authentication & Visitor Architecture
+
+Two visitor implementations (`TpmVisitor` is the base interface):
+
+### TpmPopVisitor (default, `POP_ENABLED=TRUE`)
+- Uses Alibaba Cloud POP (Platform of Platforms) API gateway
+- Authenticates via `PopVisitor::validateCredential()` / `PopVisitor::refreshCredential()`
+- Creates either `VpcCredential` or `ClassicCredential` depending on config
+- Calls `yundun-systrust` API actions: `GenerateNonce`, `GenerateAikcert`, `ProduceAikcert`,
+  `RegisterMessage`, `PutMessage`, `QuoteMessage`
+
+### TpmHttpVisitor (fallback, `HTTP_ENABLED=TRUE`)
+- Direct HTTP POST to `trusted-server-vpc.{region}.aliyuncs.com`
+- **No authentication on the HTTP requests themselves** - relies on:
+  1. Network-level gating (VPC-only endpoint, `-vpc` suffix)
+  2. TPM cryptographic binding (MakeCredential blobs are useless without the real TPM)
+- Uses `CurlUtils::http_post` with JSON request/response
+
+### Credential types
+1. **VpcCredential** (default) - uses instance metadata at `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/` to get temporary `AccessKeyId`, `AccessKeySecret`, `SecurityToken`, `Expiration`
+2. **ClassicCredential** - static access key/secret from config
+
+### Endpoint construction (from `ali_trust_init_tpm_visitor` decompilation)
+When no explicit endpoint is configured, constructs:
+```
+"trusted-server-vpc." + GuestInfo.region_id + ".aliyuncs.com"
+```
+Also reads `AIKSS_SERVER_ENDPOINT` and `QUOTE_SERVER_ENDPOINT` from `NetConfig` singleton.
+
+## trust-agent Main Flow (from Hex-Rays decompilation)
+
+```
+main():
+  1. Print "Trust Agent Version: 9a6e56c17362ced8592fb5ca3a509ad59185598d"
+  2. Create logger → /var/log/trust-agent
+  3. Create scheduler(5 tasks, 1800s interval, 300s initial delay)
+  4. ali_trust_tpm_init_context("9a6e56c17362ced8592fb5ca3a509ad59185598d")
+  5. Schedule "instance registration" → ali_trust_tpm_register
+  6. Schedule "remote attestation" → attestation_loop (sub_BA00)
+```
+
+### Attestation Loop (runs every 30 minutes)
+```
+sub_BA00():
+  1. ali_trust_tpm_generate_aik_cert(1, &aik_context)
+     → Called EVERY cycle, not just once at boot
+     → First param=1 may mean "include cert chain"
+     → If fails: "error while requesting aik cert, errno: %d"
+
+  2. ali_trust_tpm_generate_quote(aik_context, 0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 0, &quote)
+     → Params: (context, ?, ?, ?, pcr_bank_mask=3?, algo=1, ?, &output)
+     → If fails: "error while generating quote, errno: %d"
+
+  3. ali_trust_tpm_attestation(quote, &result)
+     → Submits quote to server, gets back ali_trust_attest_ra_result_t
+     → If fails: "error while initiating remote attestation, errno: %d"
+
+  4. Log: "system trust status: %d" (result[0])
+```
+
+## API Flow (from BinaryNinja decompilation of `libtrust_network.so`)
+
+### Phase 1: Register (`/register`)
+
+`TpmHttpVisitor::register_inst()` - registers the instance with the trusted server.
+
+Request params (JSON POST):
+- `RequestId` - generated UUID
+- `PropertyUuid`
+- `InstanceId`
+- `InstanceType`
+- `PropertyPublicIp`
+- `PropertyPrivateIp`
+- `PropertyName`
+- `PropertyAffiliation`
+
+Response: `httpStatusCode`
+
+### Phase 2: AIK Certificate (`/aikcert/produce`)
+
+`TpmHttpVisitor::aik_cert()` - Privacy CA flow.
+
+**Confirmed function signature (BinaryNinja):**
+```cpp
+uint64_t aik_cert(
+    /* this */,                    // TpmHttpVisitor, base URL at this+0x70/0x78
+    const string& ek_pubkey,       // → "EkPubKey"
+    const string& ek_cert,         // → "EkCert"
+    const string& aik_name,        // → "AikName"
+    const string& cert_request,    // → "CertRequest" (CSR)
+    bool include_cert_chain,       // → "IncludeCertChain" (sprintf'd as "%d")
+    string& out_key_cred_blob,     // ← output: "keyCredentialBlob"
+    string& out_data_cred_blob     // ← output: "dataCredentialBlob"
+)
+```
+
+**Confirmed flow (from decompilation):**
+1. Constructs URL: `base_url + "/aikcert/produce"`
+2. Builds `std::map<string,string>` with `RequestId`, `EkPubKey`, `EkCert`, `AikName`,
+   `CertRequest`, `IncludeCertChain`
+3. `assemble_params()` → `CurlUtils::http_post()` (plain HTTP, no auth headers)
+4. Parses JSON response with `Json::Reader::parse()`
+5. Checks `json["httpStatusCode"] == 200` (0xc8)
+6. On success: extracts nested `json[...]["keyCredentialBlob"]` → arg7,
+   `json[...]["dataCredentialBlob"]` → arg8
+7. Returns 0 on success, 0x3003 on any error
+
+**Interpretation:** Server validates EK cert against Aliyun TPM CA chain, then uses
+`TPM2_MakeCredential` to create challenge blobs. Client calls `TPM2_ActivateCredential`
+(in `libtrust_tpm.so`) to prove AIK is co-resident with EK. The `CertRequest` (CSR) is
+sent so the server can sign it - but the actual signed cert delivery mechanism is still
+unclear (may be wrapped in the credential blobs, or may require a follow-up call).
+
+### Phase 3: Attestation/Quote (`/quote`)
+
+`TpmHttpVisitor::attestation()` - submits TPM quote evidence.
+
+**Confirmed function signature:**
+```cpp
+uint64_t attestation(
+    /* this */,
+    const string& file_data,             // → "FileData" (TPM quote + IMA log)
+    ali_trust_attest_ra_result_t& result, // ← output struct
+    string& request_id_out               // ← output: request ID
+)
+```
+
+**Confirmed flow:**
+1. Constructs URL: `base_url + "/quote"` (note: uses offset 0x50/0x58, different from aik_cert's 0x70/0x78 - may use `QUOTE_SERVER_ENDPOINT`)
+2. Sends `RequestId` + `FileData`
+3. Parses JSON, checks `httpStatusCode == 200`
+4. Extracts into result struct:
+   - `systemVerificationResult` → result field (int)
+   - `programVerificationResult` → result field (int, default=4 if missing)
+   - `kmoduleVerificationResult` → result field (int, default=4 if missing)
+   - `nextClientIMAIndex` → result field (uint64)
+   - `policyProcResult` → optional, if present calls `ali_trust_elem_init_from_c_str`
+     to parse `procData` into an `ali_trust_elem`
+
+## Key Functions (from symbol tables)
+
+### trust-agent binary
+- `ali_trust_tpm_init_context` - init with version string
+- `ali_trust_tpm_generate_aik_cert` - triggers the AIK cert flow
+- `ali_trust_tpm_register` - registers with trusted server
+- `ali_trust_tpm_generate_quote` - generates TPM quote
+- `ali_trust_tpm_attestation` - submits attestation
+
+### libtrust.so (core library - abstract interface)
+- `ali_trust_quote(nonce, pcr_bank, pcr_selection, policy_effect, policy_action, extra, &output)` - quote with policy params
+- `ali_trust_attestation(quote, &result)` - submit attestation, get `ali_trust_attest_ra_result_t`
+- `ali_trust_generate_plat_cert` / `ali_trust_renew_plat_cert` - platform certificates
+- `ali_trust_generate_app_cert` / `ali_trust_renew_app_cert` - application certificates
+- `ali_trust_generate_session_credential` / `ali_trust_verify_session_credential`
+- `ali_trust_inspect_plat_stat` - get `ali_trust_attest_ra_status_t`
+- `ali_trust_sign`, `ali_trust_encrypt`, `ali_trust_decrypt`
+- `ali_trust_create_key`, `ali_trust_import_key`, `ali_trust_export_key`
+- `ali_trust_define_sb`, `ali_trust_read_sb`, `ali_trust_write_sb` (sealed blob operations)
+
+### libtrust_tpm.so (TPM implementation)
+Key types (C++ classes under `AlibabaCloud::AliTrust`):
+- `TpmPlatformKey` - platform-level key
+- `TpmCommonKey` - general purpose key
+- `TpmUserImportedKey` - user-imported key
+- `TpmPreGeneratedKey` - pre-provisioned key
+- `TpmCommonNonVolatile` / `TpmPreGeneratedNonVolatile` - NV storage
+
+### libtrust_network.so (network layer)
+Class hierarchy:
+```
+CommonVisitor (base)
+├── PopVisitor
+│   └── TpmPopVisitor (POP API gateway, authenticated)
+└── TpmHttpVisitor (direct HTTP, VPC-only)
+
+CommonCredential (base)
+├── VpcCredential (instance metadata RAM creds)
+└── ClassicCredential (static access key/secret)
+
+NetConfig (singleton) - reads ali_trust_net.conf
+GuestInfo (singleton) - instance metadata (region, IPs, etc.)
+MachineInfo (singleton) - machine-level info
+```
+
+Virtual method table (both visitors implement same interface):
+- `register_inst(uuid, instance_id, instance_type, public_ip, private_ip, name, &affiliation)`
+- `aik_cert(ek_pubkey, ek_cert, aik_name, cert_request, include_chain, &key_blob, &data_blob)`
+- `attestation(file_data, &ra_result, &request_id)`
+
+### Trusted_serverClient operations (POP path, from C++ mangled names)
+- `registerMessageCallable` → `/register` equivalent
+- `verifyMessageCallable` → `/quote` equivalent
+- `updateComponentCallable`
+- `unregisterMessageCallable`
+- `trustEventsCallable`
+
+## TDX vs vTPM Attestation
+
+Alibaba has TWO completely separate attestation paths:
+
+| Aspect | vTPM | TDX |
+|--------|------|-----|
+| Endpoint | `trusted-server-vpc.{region}.aliyuncs.com` | `attest.{region}.aliyuncs.com` |
+| Auth | VPC-only + POP gateway (or plain HTTP) | Anonymous HTTP POST |
+| Response | Structured JSON (PCR values, trust status) | JWT (OIDC-compliant, RS256) |
+| JWKS | N/A | `https://attest.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/jwks.json` |
+| EAT Profile | Not documented | Documented |
+| Certificate | AIK cert via Privacy CA flow | N/A (enclave attestation) |
+
+## OIDC Discovery (TDX path only)
+
+```json
+{
+  "issuer": "https://attest.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com",
+  "jwks_uri": "https://attest.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/jwks.json",
+  "token_endpoint": "https://attest.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/token",
+  "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": ["RS256"]
+}
+```
+
+JWKS has one key: RSA, kid=`4653550c-5551-5e6f-92b5-22f530229751`
+
+## Decompilation Artifacts (Summary)
+
+See the detailed line-number index in the "Decompilation Artifacts" section below (after the TPM Internals section).
+
+## TPM Internals (from BinaryNinja decompilation of `libtrust_tpm.so`)
+
+### TPM Handle Defaults (`TpmPlatformKey` static constants)
+
+| Handle | Hex Value | Purpose |
+|--------|-----------|---------|
+| `ekDefaultKeyHandle` | `0x81010001` | EK persistent key (standard TPM2 EK at 0x81010001) |
+| `ekDefaultCertHandle` | `0x01c00002` | EK cert NV index (standard TPM2 EK cert NV) |
+| `aikDefaultKeyHandle` | `0x81010003` | AIK persistent key (Alibaba-specific) |
+| `aikDefaultNameNvHandle` | `0x1001000` | AIK name NV storage (Alibaba-specific) |
+
+### TPM Device Architecture
+
+Three-layer abstraction for TPM operations:
+
+```
+TpmDeviceProxy (dispatcher)
+├── TpmToolsOpsImpl (ITpmDeviceOps)
+│   └── tpm2_init() → tpm2_set_option(cmd, key, val) → tpm2_run(cmd, buf, size) → flush_tpm_context()
+│   └── Uses libtpm2-tools.so (custom, NOT upstream tpm2-tools)
+└── TpmSslOpsImpl (ITpmDeviceOps)
+    └── Uses OpenSSL with libtpm2-openssl provider
+    └── Provider searched at /usr/lib64 then /usr/lib
+    └── Operations like decrypt/encrypt/sign via OpenSSL EVP API with TPM keys
+```
+
+`TpmDeviceProxy::run(cmd_id, option_map, output_elem)`:
+- Takes a `tpm_ops_cmd_t` command ID (0-29, 0x1d max)
+- Routes to either TpmToolsOpsImpl or TpmSslOpsImpl based on command type
+- Holds a vector of `(tpm_ops_type_t, shared_ptr<ITpmDeviceOps>)` pairs
+- Acquires `TpmLock` before running (mutex-protected TPM access)
+
+### AIK Certificate Generation - FULL FLOW (RESOLVED)
+
+**`TpmAttestationImpl::generate_aik_cert(bool include_chain, _ali_trust_elem& output)`**
+
+This is the complete Privacy CA flow. Decompiled from line 96987 of the BN export.
+
+```
+Phase A: Prepare TPM Objects
+  1. Parse aikDefaultKeyHandle ("0x81010003") from hex string → uint64
+  2. Create TpmPreGeneratedKey(handle=0x81010003, algorithm=1)
+     → This is a shared_ptr, represents the AIK key in TPM persistent storage
+  3. Parse aikDefaultNameNvHandle ("0x1001000") → uint64
+  4. Create TpmPreGeneratedNonVolatile(nv_index=0x1001000)
+     → For AIK name storage
+
+Phase B: Read TPM Public Data
+  5. Call virtual method on key object → reads AIK public key from TPM
+  6. CryptoUtils::base64_encode(aik_pubkey) → AikPubKey param
+  7. Parse ekDefaultCertHandle ("0x01c00002") → uint64
+  8. Create TpmPreGeneratedNonVolatile(nv_index=0x01c00002) → for EK cert
+  9. Store objects in TpmObjectManager for lifecycle management
+
+Phase C: Build network request params & call Privacy CA
+  10. Build option map with short keys like "0", "S", "c", "e", etc.
+  11. Call server's virtual method (→ visitor.aik_cert)
+  12. ali_trust_tpm_net_aik_cert(visitor, &output_params...)
+      → Network call to /aikcert/produce
+      → Returns: keyCredentialBlob (var_6e8) and dataCredentialBlob (var_6c8)
+
+Phase D: Process keyCredentialBlob
+  13. CryptoUtils::base64_decode(keyCredentialBlob) → raw credential
+  14. Save decoded blob to "cipher_aik_key.dat" (timestamped path)
+
+Phase E: TPM2 ActivateCredential
+  15. TpmDeviceProxy::run(0x19, {"0": session_ctx, "S": session_file})
+      → Command 0x19 (25) = StartAuthSession
+  16. TpmDeviceProxy::run(0x1a, {"c": "e", "S": session_file})
+      → Command 0x1a (26) = ActivateCredential
+      → "c" is credential file, "e" is EK handle
+      → TPM proves AIK is co-resident with EK, outputs the wrapped secret
+
+Phase F: Decrypt AIK certificate with activated secret
+  17. TpmDeviceProxy::run(0x07, {"C": session, "c": cred_file, "i": input, "P": password, "o": output})
+      → Command 7 = Decrypt/Decapsulate operation
+      → Writes decrypted secret to "plain_aik_key.dat"
+  18. TpmDeviceProxy::run(0x18, {...})
+      → Command 0x18 (24) = FlushContext (cleanup)
+  19. CryptoUtils::base64_decode(dataCredentialBlob) → raw encrypted blob
+  20. FileUtils::read_file_to_string("plain_aik_key.dat") → AES key
+
+Phase G: AES Decrypt the certificate
+  21. Parse the decoded dataCredentialBlob:
+      - bytes[0:4]   = unknown (version/magic, 4 bytes skipped)
+      - bytes[4:20]  = 16-byte AES IV
+      - bytes[20:]   = AES ciphertext (encrypted AIK certificate PEM)
+  22. CryptoUtils::aes_decrypt(ciphertext, len, aes_key, iv, plaintext, &output_len)
+      → aes_key = the activated credential secret from step 17
+      → Decrypts to PEM certificate text
+
+Phase H: Cache the AIK certificate
+  23. CryptoUtils::trim_certs(decrypted_pem) → clean up whitespace/formatting
+  24. ali_trust_elem_init_from_c_str(pem_data) → store in output elem
+  25. TpmAttestationImpl::cache_aik_certs(pem_data)
+      → split_pem_cert() to separate cert chain
+      → Store individual certs as DER in TPM NV indices
+```
+
+**KEY INSIGHT:** The AIK certificate is signed server-side and delivered encrypted in the
+`dataCredentialBlob`. The `keyCredentialBlob` contains a TPM2_MakeCredential wrapper around
+an AES key. Only the real TPM (with the real EK) can unwrap the AES key and decrypt the cert.
+This is a textbook Privacy CA implementation with AES envelope encryption.
+
+**There is NO second round-trip.** The entire flow is: one API call → two blobs → TPM unwrap → AES decrypt → PEM cert.
+
+### AIK Certificate Renewal
+
+`TpmAttestationImpl::renew_aik_cert(bool include_chain, _ali_trust_elem& output)` (line 94901):
+1. Creates new `TpmPreGeneratedKey` with `aikDefaultKeyHandle`
+2. Calls `TpmKey::set_auto_clear()` on the key (marks for cleanup)
+3. Creates new `TpmPlatformKey` (re-provisions the platform key)
+4. Calls `remove_cached_aik_certs()` to clear old certs from NV storage
+5. Then proceeds with the same Privacy CA flow
+
+### AIK Certificate Caching (where the cert ends up)
+
+`TpmAttestationImpl::cache_aik_certs(const string& pem_data)` (line 96508):
+1. `CryptoUtils::split_pem_cert()` - splits PEM bundle into individual certs
+2. Converts each cert from PEM to DER (`CryptoUtils::cert_pem2der()`)
+3. Stores the DER certs in TPM NV indices
+4. The split suggests the cert chain may have multiple certs (AIK cert + issuer chain)
+
+### Certificate Expiry Checking
+
+In the outer `ali_trust_tpm_generate_aik_cert()` wrapper (line 68522):
+1. First checks `capability(6)` - if supported, goes straight to full cert generation
+2. Otherwise: reads cached AIK cert, calls `CryptoUtils::split_pem_cert()`
+3. `CryptoUtils::check_cert_expiry(cert, len, &threshold)` with threshold = `time() + 0x15180`
+   - 0x15180 = 86400 seconds = **24 hours**
+4. If cert expires within 24 hours → trigger full renewal
+5. If cert is still valid → use cached version (`ali_trust_elem_move`)
+6. This explains why `generate_aik_cert` is called every 30 minutes but doesn't always hit the network
+
+### Quote Generation
+
+`TpmAttestationImpl::generate_quote()` (line 95121):
+- PCR selection: `"sha1:0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10+sha256:0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10"` (both SHA-1 and SHA-256 banks, PCRs 0-10)
+- Output file: `pcrlist.dat` (timestamped)
+- `TpmDeviceProxy::run(0x0b, option_map)` → Command 0x0b (11) = **TPM2_Quote**
+- Option keys: `"o"` = output file, `"#"` = PCR selection
+- Also handles IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) log:
+  - Reads `/sys/kernel/security/ima/binary_runtime_measurements`
+  - Saves to `ima_log.dat`
+
+### Attestation Submission
+
+`TpmAttestationImpl::attestation()` (line 94126):
+- Simple tailcall: `ali_trust_tpm_net_attestation(visitor, result, ...)`
+- Delegates entirely to the network layer's `attestation()` method
+
+### TPM Command ID Map (partial, from `TpmDeviceProxy::run` calls)
+
+| CMD ID | Hex | Operation |
+|--------|-----|-----------|
+| 7 | 0x07 | Decrypt/Decapsulate (via TpmSslOpsImpl) |
+| 11 | 0x0B | TPM2_Quote |
+| 24 | 0x18 | TPM2_FlushContext |
+| 25 | 0x19 | TPM2_StartAuthSession |
+| 26 | 0x1a | TPM2_ActivateCredential |
+| 29 | 0x1d | (max valid command) |
+
+### `CryptoUtils` Functions Identified
+
+| Function | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `base64_encode(data, len, &output_string)` | Base64 encode |
+| `base64_decode(string, buf, buf_len, &output_elem)` | Base64 decode |
+| `aes_decrypt(ciphertext, len, key, iv, plaintext, &out_len)` | AES decryption |
+| `split_pem_cert(pem_bundle, &cert, &chain)` | Split PEM chain |
+| `trim_certs(pem_string)` | Clean up PEM formatting |
+| `check_cert_expiry(cert, len, &threshold_time)` | Check X.509 expiry |
+| `pubkey_from_pem_cert(pem, buf, len, &out_len)` | Extract public key |
+| `cert_der2pem(der_elem, &pem_elem)` | DER to PEM conversion |
+| `cert_pem2der(pem_elem, &der_elem)` | PEM to DER conversion |
+| `hash_sha256(data, len, &output_string)` | SHA-256 hash |
+
+## Open Questions (Updated)
+
+1. ~~**What happens after ActivateCredential?**~~ **RESOLVED.** Full flow documented above.
+   The activated credential secret is used as an AES key to decrypt `dataCredentialBlob`,
+   which contains the AIK certificate PEM. No second round-trip needed.
+
+2. **Can we extract the AIK cert independently?** The cert is cached in TPM NV indices
+   (via `cache_aik_certs`) and also temporarily written to disk as files. The DER-encoded
+   certs are stored in NV. With `tpm2_nvread` it should be possible to extract them.
+
+3. **What CA signs the AIK cert?** Still unknown from decompilation alone. The `CertRequest`
+   (CSR) parameter in the API suggests the server signs it. The `AIKSS_SERVER_ENDPOINT`
+   config option suggests a dedicated AIK Signing Service. The cert chain is split and
+   cached, so the response likely includes the full chain (AIK cert + intermediate + root).
+
+4. **Is `ali_trust_generate_plat_cert` useful?** Still needs investigation.
+
+5. **Can we use the quote data for non-interactive verification?** The quote generation
+   uses standard TPM2_Quote with SHA-1+SHA-256 banks, PCRs 0-10. If we can get:
+   (a) the AIK certificate (from NV or by running the Privacy CA flow ourselves), and
+   (b) a raw TPM2_Quote blob (from `tpm2_quote` directly or the `pcrlist.dat` file),
+   then we could verify the attestation without going through Alibaba's `/quote` endpoint.
+   **This is the key question for vaportpm-verify integration.**
+
+6. **Is `trustclient-opensource` actually open source?** Build path suggests it might be.
+   No public repo found yet.
+
+7. **What is the `dataCredentialBlob` format exactly?**
+   - bytes[0:4] = unknown (version? magic? AES mode indicator?)
+   - bytes[4:20] = 16-byte AES IV
+   - bytes[20:] = AES-CBC(?) encrypted PEM certificate
+   - Key = TPM2_ActivateCredential output (HMAC-derived secret)
+
+8. **What is the exact AIK key type?** The key handle `0x81010003` is in persistent storage.
+   `TpmPreGeneratedKey(handle, algorithm=1)` - what does algorithm=1 map to? (likely RSA 2048)
+
+## Decompilation Artifacts
+
+- `trustagent-hexrays` - Hex-Rays decompilation of `/usr/local/bin/trust-agent`
+- `libtrust_network.so.1.0.0.bndb_pseudo_c.txt` - BinaryNinja pseudo-C export of network library (1.1M lines)
+- `libtrust_tpm.so.1.0.0.bndb_pseudo_c.txt` - BinaryNinja pseudo-C export of TPM library (210K lines)
+
+### Key functions in `libtrust_network.so` BN export (line numbers):
+- `308423` - `TpmHttpVisitor::register_inst`
+- `308917` - `TpmHttpVisitor::aik_cert` (fully analyzed)
+- `309509` - `TpmHttpVisitor::attestation` (fully analyzed)
+- `301886` - `ali_trust_init_tpm_visitor` (endpoint construction)
+- `305055` - `TpmPopVisitor::register_inst`
+- `305738` - `TpmPopVisitor::aik_cert`
+- `306585` - `TpmPopVisitor::attestation`
+
+### Key functions in `libtrust_tpm.so` BN export (line numbers):
+- `96987` - `TpmAttestationImpl::generate_aik_cert` (**fully analyzed** - the core Privacy CA flow)
+- `94901` - `TpmAttestationImpl::renew_aik_cert`
+- `95121` - `TpmAttestationImpl::generate_quote`
+- `94126` - `TpmAttestationImpl::attestation` (thin wrapper → network)
+- `78153` - `TpmToolsOpsImpl::run` (tpm2-tools dispatch)
+- `78218` - `TpmSslOpsImpl::init` (OpenSSL + tpm2-openssl provider)
+- `78312` - `TpmSslOpsImpl::run` (OpenSSL-based TPM ops)
+- `78795` - `TpmDeviceProxy::run` (command dispatcher)
+- `96508` - `TpmAttestationImpl::cache_aik_certs` (NV cert caching)
+- `95743` - `TpmAttestationImpl::capability`
+- `72827` - `ali_trust_tpm_init_context`
+- `68522` - `ali_trust_tpm_generate_aik_cert` (outer wrapper with expiry check)
+
+## Next Steps
+
+- [x] ~~Decompile `libtrust_tpm.so` to understand the ActivateCredential flow~~ **DONE** - full flow documented
+- [ ] Look at `TpmPopVisitor::aik_cert` to see if POP path has additional fields/steps
+- [ ] Check if `ali_trust_generate_plat_cert` or `ali_trust_generate_app_cert` produce portable certs
+- [ ] Search for the `trustclient-opensource` repo
+- [ ] **Spin up an Alibaba Cloud ECS instance** to:
+  - Capture `/aikcert/produce` and `/quote` traffic
+  - Extract the AIK cert from NV (via `tpm2_nvread`)
+  - Determine the AIK cert CA chain
+  - Test if we can run `tpm2_quote` directly with the AIK key at `0x81010003`
+- [ ] Determine if we can replicate the Privacy CA flow from Rust (for vaportpm-verify)
+- [ ] Analyze whether the AIK cert + raw TPM2_Quote is sufficient for offline verification
+
+## References
+
+- [Keylime PR #1448](https://github.com/keylime/keylime/pull/1448) - Added Aliyun EK cert to keylime cert store
+- [Alibaba Cloud Remote Attestation](https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/ecs/user-guide/remote-attestation-service)
+- [Alibaba Cloud Trusted Computing](https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/ecs/user-guide/overview-of-trusted-computing-capabilities)
+- [EAT Profile (TDX only)](https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/ecs/user-guide/eat-profile)
+- [Create trusted instance (RAM policy with yundun-systrust actions)](https://www.alibabacloud.com/help/en/ecs/user-guide/create-a-security-enhanced-instance)
diff --git a/experiments/alibaba/alibaba-trust-us-east-1.sh b/experiments/alibaba/alibaba-trust-us-east-1.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ce50cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/experiments/alibaba/alibaba-trust-us-east-1.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+CURPATH=`pwd`
+TOKEN=`curl -s -X PUT -H "X-aliyun-ecs-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 120" "http://100.100.100.200/latest/api/token"`
+REGION_ID=`curl -s --retry 1 --max-time 3 -H "X-aliyun-ecs-metadata-token: $token" http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/region-id`
+PROCESSOR=`uname -m`
+VERSION=""
+TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE1=http://trustclient-${REGION_ID}.oss-${REGION_ID}-internal.aliyuncs.com
+TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE2=http://trustclient-${REGION_ID}.oss-${REGION_ID}.aliyuncs.com
+TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE3=http://t-trustclient-${REGION_ID}.oss-${REGION_ID}-internal.aliyuncs.com
+
+get_last_version()
+{
+  echo "get last version from 1"
+  HTTP_CODE=`curl -IsL -w "%{http_code}\n" --retry 1 --max-time 3 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE1}""$1" -o /dev/null`
+  if [ ${HTTP_CODE} -eq 200 ]; then
+    VERSION=`curl -s --retry 1 --max-time 3 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE1}""$1"`
+    return 1
+  fi
+  echo "get last version from 2"
+  HTTP_CODE=`curl -IsL -w "%{http_code}\n" --retry 1 --max-time 3 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE2}""$1" -o /dev/null`
+  if [ ${HTTP_CODE} -eq 200 ]; then
+    VERSION=`curl -s --retry 1 --max-time 3 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE2}""$1"`
+    return 2
+  fi
+  echo "get last version from 3"
+  HTTP_CODE=`curl -IsL -w "%{http_code}\n" --retry 1 --max-time 3 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE2}""$1" -o /dev/null`
+  if [ ${HTTP_CODE} -eq 200 ]; then
+    VERSION=`curl -s --retry 1 --max-time 3 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE3}""$1"`
+    return 3
+  fi
+  echo "get last version error" 1>&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+download_file()
+{
+  echo "download from 1"
+  wget -q -t 1 -T 5 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE1}""$1" -O "$2"
+  if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+    return 1
+  fi
+  echo "download from 2"
+  wget -q -t 1 -T 5 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE2}""$1" -O "$2"
+  if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+    return 2
+  fi
+  echo "download from 3"
+  wget  -q -t 1 -T 5 "${TRUSTAGENT_UPDATE_SITE3}""$1" -O "$2"
+  if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+    return 3
+  fi
+  rm -rf "$2"
+  echo "download file error" 1>&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+install_agent_centos()
+{
+  RPM_NAME="t-trustclient.bin.rpm"
+  RPM_MD5="t-trustclient.bin.rpm.md5"
+
+  echo "downloading package version..."
+  get_last_version "/version/${PROCESSOR}/last"
+  echo "downloading package install..."
+  download_file "/download/linux/centos/${PROCESSOR}/${VERSION}/t-trustclient-${VERSION}-${PROCESSOR}.rpm" "${RPM_NAME}"
+  echo "downloading package checksum..."
+  download_file "/download/linux/centos/${PROCESSOR}/${VERSION}/t-trustclient-${VERSION}-${PROCESSOR}.rpm.md5" "${RPM_MD5}"
+
+  echo "checking package file..."
+  md5_check=`md5sum "${RPM_NAME}" | awk '{print $1}' `
+  md5_server=`head -1 "${RPM_MD5}" | awk '{print $1}'`
+  if [ "$md5_check"x = "$md5_server"x ]
+  then
+    echo "check package success"
+
+    cd ${CURPATH}
+    chmod +x "${RPM_NAME}"
+    yum install -y "${RPM_NAME}"
+    if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "start trust agent..."
+      systemctl enable t-trustclient.service &>/dev/null
+      systemctl start t-trustclient.service &>/dev/null
+      if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+        echo "TrustAgent OK."
+      fi
+    fi
+  else
+    echo "checksum error";
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  rm -f "${RPM_MD5}"
+  rm -f "${RPM_NAME}"
+}
+
+install_agent_ubuntu()
+{
+  DEB_NAME="t-trustclient.bin.deb"
+  DEB_MD5="t-trustclient.bin.deb.md5"
+
+  echo "downloading package version..."
+  get_last_version "/version/${PROCESSOR}/last"
+  echo "downloading package install..."
+  download_file "/download/linux/ubuntu/${PROCESSOR}/${VERSION}/t-trustclient-${VERSION}-${PROCESSOR}.deb" "${DEB_NAME}"
+  echo "downloading package checksum..."
+  download_file "/download/linux/ubuntu/${PROCESSOR}/${VERSION}/t-trustclient-${VERSION}-${PROCESSOR}.deb.md5" "${DEB_MD5}"
+
+  echo "checking package file..."
+  md5_check=`md5sum "${DEB_NAME}" | awk '{print $1}' `
+  md5_server=`head -1 "${DEB_MD5}" | awk '{print $1}'`
+  if [ "$md5_check"x = "$md5_server"x ]
+  then
+    echo "check package success"
+
+    cd ${CURPATH}
+    chmod +x "${DEB_NAME}"
+    dpkg -i "${DEB_NAME}"
+    if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "start trust agent..."
+      systemctl enable t-trustclient.service &>/dev/null
+      systemctl start t-trustclient.service &>/dev/null
+      if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+        echo "TrustAgent OK."
+      fi
+    fi
+  else
+    echo "checksum error";
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  rm -f "${DEB_MD5}"
+  rm -f "${DEB_NAME}"
+}
+
+if lsb_release -d | grep -q -e "Ubuntu" -e "Debian"; then
+  install_agent_ubuntu
+elif lsb_release -d | grep -q -e "Alibaba Cloud Linux" -e "CentOS" -e "Anolis"; then
+  install_agent_centos
+else
+  echo "Unsupported Image!!!"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/experiments/alibaba/aliyun-ekmf-ca.crt b/experiments/alibaba/aliyun-ekmf-ca.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37f9e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/experiments/alibaba/aliyun-ekmf-ca.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+Certificate:
+    Data:
+        Version: 3 (0x2)
+        Serial Number: 2 (0x2)
+    Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
+        Issuer: C=CN, O=Aliyun, OU=Aliyun TPM Root CA, CN=Aliyun TPM Root CA
+        Validity
+            Not Before: Sep 16 05:48:24 2021 GMT
+            Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 2030 GMT
+        Subject: C=CN, O=Aliyun, OU=Aliyun TPM Endorsement Key Manufacture CA, CN=Aliyun TPM EKMF CA
+        Subject Public Key Info:
+            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
+                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
+                Modulus:
+                    00:e5:59:24:2b:c3:ac:32:47:71:76:11:bf:d3:c5:
+                    c3:05:13:07:81:a8:3a:4b:9a:c3:b4:7f:79:a9:bc:
+                    57:c0:4e:03:88:eb:df:50:02:14:89:9f:b9:d4:a7:
+                    bc:f6:34:2f:69:05:f4:1b:21:f4:71:cd:f0:5e:0b:
+                    0a:4e:bb:10:14:cd:17:46:8e:3f:26:3d:a9:80:cc:
+                    c9:4a:a5:4e:82:10:cf:08:4d:82:9b:5a:a0:b0:e4:
+                    be:62:a0:56:37:d0:cd:6d:35:85:97:94:e1:6b:ff:
+                    9f:ee:67:bc:d1:fc:f9:70:e7:53:bd:80:cb:ec:ad:
+                    86:c7:fd:a2:1a:b5:d8:3f:2e:ed:bc:1b:ec:d6:98:
+                    90:73:39:1f:fc:d5:9b:7f:29:e9:c0:d2:b2:83:bb:
+                    b0:ca:25:dd:dd:df:5e:ff:45:7e:d1:bf:7e:93:af:
+                    2d:75:d1:87:f0:7d:f4:b9:f7:46:bf:f4:e4:74:32:
+                    9a:0f:9a:0d:dc:43:a2:43:6c:9b:0d:58:1a:3c:6f:
+                    38:62:67:9a:f9:bc:2a:47:f6:03:b2:8b:48:41:25:
+                    39:85:57:c6:a5:84:4a:0d:b4:1d:19:e2:24:aa:6e:
+                    8f:6a:95:06:7d:60:4b:4e:cc:bf:6e:74:52:93:57:
+                    3a:b9:14:0e:85:54:35:2c:75:51:a5:44:7d:fe:21:
+                    e2:77
+                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
+        X509v3 extensions:
+            Authority Information Access: 
+                CA Issuers - URI:https://aliyun-tpm-ca.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/pki001/root-ca.crt
+
+            X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: 
+
+                Full Name:
+                  URI:https://aliyun-tpm-ca.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/pki001/root-ca.crl
+
+            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
+                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
+            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
+                CA:TRUE
+            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
+                81:AA:9A:64:92:88:FF:07:07:07:50:9A:CF:97:4E:FF:66:59:50:C8
+            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 
+                keyid:58:33:7A:9C:D0:E8:C3:61:21:67:43:91:3E:FC:21:7D:63:81:9B:1D
+
+    Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
+         9e:03:04:94:17:88:9c:8f:23:81:9a:95:c3:21:2d:9e:6e:6c:
+         e3:18:08:7c:2d:aa:2c:dd:87:1d:0a:30:a9:7f:1f:76:83:37:
+         a8:b6:d4:8e:d9:68:b8:e6:53:45:e6:5b:41:d1:35:34:11:21:
+         04:95:13:b7:23:06:e2:e8:4f:18:22:49:cc:aa:e0:b9:9c:ed:
+         c6:72:93:c7:07:ae:bb:3b:93:19:d4:b8:66:bf:1d:03:82:cd:
+         e3:ec:e0:0a:ba:2b:a7:77:b0:fa:11:1b:84:e6:ed:08:0b:32:
+         dc:be:4a:70:d9:b7:39:62:16:e4:b7:52:5c:2a:94:d8:2a:fe:
+         55:f4:c7:62:66:fa:54:67:2c:7b:8f:70:d5:12:33:97:ae:cc:
+         ab:87:69:7d:66:4e:82:1b:e0:e9:4f:6d:a4:52:1e:06:e9:83:
+         6e:a1:e0:5f:24:09:d6:37:60:0c:28:ec:cd:95:b0:6a:06:60:
+         5b:d2:0e:c9:2c:34:e1:4d:7c:1d:8c:ec:61:ce:e1:36:d7:90:
+         c0:44:b4:52:80:89:77:31:36:7d:73:dd:af:44:cc:97:81:5b:
+         07:ae:7f:f4:df:d8:b6:2f:1d:f3:65:de:f5:2f:c0:2a:26:de:
+         04:b9:f9:f3:ef:c4:97:37:67:b6:fc:f5:7b:e2:ca:fd:5c:82:
+         af:b1:50:1a
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/experiments/alibaba/aliyun-root-ca.crt b/experiments/alibaba/aliyun-root-ca.crt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e7d383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/experiments/alibaba/aliyun-root-ca.crt
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+Certificate:
+    Data:
+        Version: 3 (0x2)
+        Serial Number: 1 (0x1)
+    Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
+        Issuer: C=CN, O=Aliyun, OU=Aliyun TPM Root CA, CN=Aliyun TPM Root CA
+        Validity
+            Not Before: Sep 16 05:46:41 2021 GMT
+            Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 2030 GMT
+        Subject: C=CN, O=Aliyun, OU=Aliyun TPM Root CA, CN=Aliyun TPM Root CA
+        Subject Public Key Info:
+            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
+                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
+                Modulus:
+                    00:cb:57:f6:52:97:43:65:2e:64:c3:a7:49:df:79:
+                    05:c2:9b:69:a9:ef:1c:49:90:89:79:64:92:6d:1f:
+                    cc:a9:91:35:3e:7a:cf:68:e0:a1:2f:dd:5b:a8:d5:
+                    26:0e:53:19:65:40:b9:51:3d:d2:20:9d:24:d0:1b:
+                    e3:23:c2:9c:85:ce:5e:d4:68:e9:13:2d:de:80:10:
+                    28:63:54:8d:2c:8d:4f:1f:e0:e8:d6:55:8f:6c:f4:
+                    f6:47:aa:54:05:a6:a8:05:ac:31:62:c8:dc:6f:8f:
+                    3d:18:79:75:7f:8d:01:d7:f3:ed:18:7c:1e:12:85:
+                    52:6c:be:47:16:b6:6d:17:cf:c6:1d:eb:ab:c0:c2:
+                    25:43:7a:7d:4c:e7:d1:0e:79:46:36:76:5e:c2:2b:
+                    35:81:55:bd:ac:53:ac:81:ad:db:90:f6:93:b4:70:
+                    36:45:d3:9c:1d:1a:5b:67:7f:db:0a:c2:c1:fe:0f:
+                    d7:55:5e:61:1c:cd:7b:02:23:66:ca:f8:65:b6:4a:
+                    3c:00:a1:dc:9c:f7:cc:c6:48:69:8b:8e:6c:be:a0:
+                    8c:59:e6:17:8d:e8:9f:4b:18:42:3d:d3:d8:7f:bf:
+                    a2:37:31:3e:bb:dd:56:b2:7e:26:5a:20:1b:af:45:
+                    a2:87:6a:d9:a9:7d:ab:1a:a4:29:bb:a9:f6:20:5a:
+                    f9:53
+                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
+        X509v3 extensions:
+            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
+                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
+            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
+                CA:TRUE
+            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
+                58:33:7A:9C:D0:E8:C3:61:21:67:43:91:3E:FC:21:7D:63:81:9B:1D
+            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 
+                keyid:58:33:7A:9C:D0:E8:C3:61:21:67:43:91:3E:FC:21:7D:63:81:9B:1D
+
+    Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption
+         b4:ce:bd:c6:b5:8d:06:85:f0:46:45:98:20:5e:ef:0a:8f:7f:
+         d9:ea:e3:ce:aa:fa:48:27:e2:96:7d:b9:c3:ef:19:34:f5:f0:
+         3a:30:33:9e:bc:e5:3f:17:59:58:9f:3c:5f:45:a9:8a:b1:61:
+         27:72:97:dc:91:01:be:36:48:a7:5d:1c:a6:ae:83:c3:dc:45:
+         82:c2:f3:30:80:25:46:e3:8f:df:b6:8b:20:24:69:ec:30:e5:
+         d5:62:08:2c:f0:e2:42:cb:76:6c:ec:ee:66:bc:16:5d:a6:d1:
+         67:7c:c1:3b:e7:be:73:09:b4:05:99:c3:49:11:c8:6d:17:9d:
+         b1:7d:5e:bd:c5:08:4a:95:ba:59:72:d7:b9:b3:b3:58:f5:2d:
+         a1:7f:6a:29:14:bc:d3:8b:33:5c:8e:6f:f5:f2:ba:97:8f:ad:
+         6c:2a:91:25:70:f9:4a:8f:7e:51:8c:0a:8f:c1:fe:41:da:a5:
+         e1:fd:2d:8b:de:5e:00:74:6d:a3:7c:b3:38:d6:30:d6:90:cf:
+         b9:7d:08:a5:82:f3:cb:db:4d:62:b0:c7:96:0f:f6:a6:7e:1e:
+         79:04:03:83:57:4d:b0:93:ca:71:74:75:76:ea:20:0a:9a:b9:
+         9d:0e:0e:dd:4f:52:f3:ff:c0:13:3c:d8:ca:7a:5a:2f:d8:4e:
+         98:41:a9:62
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDkDCCAnigAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQwFADBYMQswCQYDVQQGEwJDTjEP
+MA0GA1UECgwGQWxpeXVuMRswGQYDVQQLDBJBbGl5dW4gVFBNIFJvb3QgQ0ExGzAZ
+BgNVBAMMEkFsaXl1biBUUE0gUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0yMTA5MTYwNTQ2NDFaGA8yMDMw
+MTIzMTIzNTk1OVowWDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQ04xDzANBgNVBAoMBkFsaXl1bjEbMBkG
+A1UECwwSQWxpeXVuIFRQTSBSb290IENBMRswGQYDVQQDDBJBbGl5dW4gVFBNIFJv
+b3QgQ0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDLV/ZSl0NlLmTD
+p0nfeQXCm2mp7xxJkIl5ZJJtH8ypkTU+es9o4KEv3Vuo1SYOUxllQLlRPdIgnSTQ
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+eXV/jQHX8+0YfB4ShVJsvkcWtm0Xz8Yd66vAwiVDen1M59EOeUY2dl7CKzWBVb2s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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----