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WalkthroughThis change adds Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, Jenkins, and documentation assets; updates .gitignore; tweaks one Thymeleaf template; and deletes multiple Spring Boot backend classes (controllers, models, repositories, services, and security configuration). Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor User
participant Ingress as NGINX Ingress
participant SVC as bankapp-service (ClusterIP)
participant POD as bankapp Pod
participant DB as MySQL
User->>Ingress: HTTP(S) request
Ingress->>SVC: Route to service port 8080
SVC->>POD: Forward to pod targetPort 8080
POD->>DB: JDBC connect using ConfigMap/Secret env
DB-->>POD: Query results
POD-->>User: HTTP response
note right of POD: Persistent storage via PV/PVC (hostPath)
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~60 minutes Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers
Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
✨ Finishing touches🧪 Generate unit tests
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Actionable comments posted: 9
Caution
Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.
⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
terraform/.terraform/providers/registry.terraform.io/hashicorp/aws/5.65.0/windows_amd64/LICENSE.txt (1)
1-376: Remove committed Terraform provider artifacts.Line 1: Bundling the provider’s LICENSE inside
terraform/.terraform/...means we’re committing the generated provider cache. That directory is created byterraform init, varies per platform, and packages third-party binaries/licenses we’re not meant to redistribute. It bloats the repo and risks future compliance drift when upstream updates their terms. Please drop the entire.terraformdirectory from git and add it to.gitignore, letting Terraform reacquire providers during deployment.
🧹 Nitpick comments (3)
README.md (1)
80-83: Add languages to fenced code blocks for lint complianceLine 80’s URL snippet uses bare triple backticks, which triggered markdownlint’s MD040 warning. Please annotate these literal blocks with an explicit language (e.g.,
text) so the lint pipeline stays green. Same applies to the block at Line 224.kubernetes/mysql-deployment.yml (1)
18-41: Harden the MySQL pod security contextAt Lines 18-41 the pod runs with default privileges, which allows privilege escalation and root UID inside the container. Given Checkov flagged CKV_K8S_20/23, please add a container-level
securityContext(runAsNonRoot,runAsUser,readOnlyRootFilesystem,allowPrivilegeEscalation: false) aligned with what the MySQL image supports. This closes easy privilege-escalation vectors in production.kubernetes/bankapp-deployment.yml (1)
44-55: Restore the health probes for safer rollouts.With both readiness and liveness probes commented out, Kubernetes has no way to gate traffic or recycle hung pods. That increases the risk of 5xxs during deploys and hides deadlocks at runtime. Please re-enable (and adjust, if needed) the probes so the controller can make informed decisions.
- # readinessProbe: - # httpGet: - # path: /actuator/health # Update this based on your app's health endpoint - # port: 8080 - # initialDelaySeconds: 10 - # periodSeconds: 5 - # livenessProbe: - # httpGet: - # path: /actuator/health # Update this based on your app's health endpoint - # port: 8080 - # initialDelaySeconds: 30 - # periodSeconds: 10 + readinessProbe: + httpGet: + path: /actuator/health + port: 8080 + initialDelaySeconds: 10 + periodSeconds: 5 + livenessProbe: + httpGet: + path: /actuator/health + port: 8080 + initialDelaySeconds: 30 + periodSeconds: 10
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
terraform/bankapp-automate-key.pubis excluded by!**/*.pub
📒 Files selected for processing (27)
.gitignore(1 hunks)Dockerfile(1 hunks)README.md(1 hunks)kubernetes/README.md(1 hunks)kubernetes/bankapp-deployment.yml(1 hunks)kubernetes/bankapp-namespace.yaml(1 hunks)kubernetes/bankapp-service.yaml(1 hunks)kubernetes/configmap.yaml(1 hunks)kubernetes/mysql-deployment.yml(1 hunks)kubernetes/mysql-service.yaml(1 hunks)kubernetes/persistent-volume-claim.yaml(1 hunks)kubernetes/persistent-volume.yaml(1 hunks)kubernetes/secrets.yaml(1 hunks)secrets.yaml(1 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/config/SecurityConfig.java(0 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/controller/BankController.java(0 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/model/Account.java(0 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/model/Transaction.java(0 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/repository/AccountRepository.java(0 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/repository/TransactionRepository.java(0 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/service/AccountService.java(0 hunks)src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/service/TransactionService.java(0 hunks)src/main/resources/templates/transactions.html(1 hunks)terraform/.terraform/providers/registry.terraform.io/hashicorp/aws/5.65.0/windows_amd64/LICENSE.txt(1 hunks)terraform/ec2.tf(1 hunks)terraform/output.tf(1 hunks)terraform/terraform.tf(1 hunks)
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (8)
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/config/SecurityConfig.java
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/service/TransactionService.java
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/model/Transaction.java
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/repository/AccountRepository.java
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/repository/TransactionRepository.java
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/controller/BankController.java
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/model/Account.java
- src/main/java/com/example/bankapp/service/AccountService.java
🧰 Additional context used
🧠 Learnings (2)
📚 Learning: 2024-11-07T15:08:26.651Z
Learnt from: sneh-create
PR: LondheShubham153/Springboot-BankApp#1
File: Dockerfile:35-35
Timestamp: 2024-11-07T15:08:26.651Z
Learning: When reviewing the `Dockerfile` in the `Springboot-BankApp` project, do not suggest changes related to simplifying JAR handling, adding a non-root user, or adding health checks unless specifically requested.
Applied to files:
Dockerfile
📚 Learning: 2024-11-07T15:07:00.867Z
Learnt from: sneh-create
PR: LondheShubham153/Springboot-BankApp#1
File: docker-compose.yml:23-23
Timestamp: 2024-11-07T15:07:00.867Z
Learning: The Docker image `snehcreate/bankrapp-v1:latest` is publicly available on Docker Hub and is used in the `docker-compose.yml` for deployment.
Applied to files:
Dockerfile
🪛 Gitleaks (8.28.0)
kubernetes/secrets.yaml
[high] 2-8: Possible Kubernetes Secret detected, posing a risk of leaking credentials/tokens from your deployments
(kubernetes-secret-yaml)
secrets.yaml
[high] 2-8: Possible Kubernetes Secret detected, posing a risk of leaking credentials/tokens from your deployments
(kubernetes-secret-yaml)
🪛 Checkov (3.2.334)
kubernetes/mysql-deployment.yml
[medium] 1-41: Containers should not run with allowPrivilegeEscalation
(CKV_K8S_20)
[medium] 1-41: Minimize the admission of root containers
(CKV_K8S_23)
terraform/ec2.tf
[medium] 65-93: Ensure that detailed monitoring is enabled for EC2 instances
(CKV_AWS_126)
[high] 65-93: Ensure Instance Metadata Service Version 1 is not enabled
(CKV_AWS_79)
kubernetes/bankapp-deployment.yml
[medium] 1-62: Containers should not run with allowPrivilegeEscalation
(CKV_K8S_20)
[medium] 1-62: Minimize the admission of root containers
(CKV_K8S_23)
🪛 markdownlint-cli2 (0.18.1)
kubernetes/README.md
80-80: Fenced code blocks should have a language specified
(MD040, fenced-code-language)
222-222: Fenced code blocks should have a language specified
(MD040, fenced-code-language)
README.md
80-80: Fenced code blocks should have a language specified
(MD040, fenced-code-language)
222-222: Fenced code blocks should have a language specified
(MD040, fenced-code-language)
| containers: | ||
| - name: bankapp | ||
| image: pratik83/bankapp-eks:v1 | ||
| ports: | ||
| - containerPort: 8080 | ||
| env: | ||
| - name: SPRING_DATASOURCE_URL | ||
| valueFrom: | ||
| configMapKeyRef: | ||
| name: bankapp-config | ||
| key: SPRING_DATASOURCE_URL | ||
| - name: SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME | ||
| valueFrom: | ||
| configMapKeyRef: | ||
| name: bankapp-config | ||
| key: SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME | ||
| - name: MYSQL_DATABASE | ||
| valueFrom: | ||
| configMapKeyRef: | ||
| name: bankapp-config | ||
| key: MYSQL_DATABASE | ||
| - name: SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD | ||
| valueFrom: | ||
| secretKeyRef: | ||
| name: mysql-secret | ||
| key: SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD | ||
| # readinessProbe: | ||
| # httpGet: | ||
| # path: /actuator/health # Update this based on your app's health endpoint | ||
| # port: 8080 | ||
| # initialDelaySeconds: 10 | ||
| # periodSeconds: 5 | ||
| # livenessProbe: | ||
| # httpGet: | ||
| # path: /actuator/health # Update this based on your app's health endpoint | ||
| # port: 8080 | ||
| # initialDelaySeconds: 30 | ||
| # periodSeconds: 10 | ||
| resources: | ||
| requests: | ||
| memory: "512Mi" | ||
| cpu: "250m" | ||
| limits: | ||
| memory: "1Gi" | ||
| cpu: "500m" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Harden the pod security context.
Right now the container inherits Kubernetes defaults (runAsUser: 0, allowPrivilegeEscalation: true). That leaves the workload running as root with privilege escalation enabled, which is a significant security posture gap for a banking app. Please lock this down by explicitly setting securityContext on the container (or pod) to drop privilege—at minimum disable privilege escalation, run the image as a non-root UID, and use the runtime’s default seccomp profile. Adjust the UID if your image uses a different non-root user.
env:
# …
secretKeyRef:
name: mysql-secret
key: SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD
+ securityContext:
+ allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+ runAsNonRoot: true
+ runAsUser: 1000
+ seccompProfile:
+ type: RuntimeDefault🧰 Tools
🪛 Checkov (3.2.334)
[medium] 1-62: Containers should not run with allowPrivilegeEscalation
(CKV_K8S_20)
[medium] 1-62: Minimize the admission of root containers
(CKV_K8S_23)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In kubernetes/bankapp-deployment.yml around lines 18 to 62, add an explicit
securityContext to the pod or container to harden privileges: set runAsNonRoot:
true and runAsUser (and optionally runAsGroup) to a non-root UID used by the
image (e.g. 1000), set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false, drop all Linux
capabilities, enable readOnlyRootFilesystem: true if compatible, and set
seccompProfile to type: RuntimeDefault (or Localhost if you use a custom
profile); place these fields under the pod.spec.securityContext (for pod-level)
or the container.securityContext (for container-level) so the container no
longer runs as root and privilege escalation is disabled.
| MYSQL_DATABASE: BankDB | ||
| SPRING_DATASOURCE_URL: jdbc:mysql://mysql-svc.bankapp-namespace.svc.cluster.local:3306/BankDB?useSSL=false&allowPublicKeyRetrieval=true&serverTimezone=UTC | ||
| SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: root |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Avoid binding the app to the MySQL root account
Line 9 currently hard codes SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: root, which means the Spring app connects using the MySQL root superuser. If the application is compromised, an attacker would inherit full administrative rights over the database, including other schemas. Please provision a dedicated, least-privileged database user (e.g., bankapp_app with only the required schema privileges), store its credentials in your Secret, and reference that user here.
- SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: root
+ SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: bankapp_appUpdate the accompanying Secret to match and ensure the MySQL init script grants the right privileges to the new account.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In kubernetes/configmap.yaml around lines 7 to 9 the SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME
is set to root which binds the app to the MySQL superuser; change this to a
dedicated low-privilege user (e.g., bankapp_app), update the Kubernetes Secret
to store that user's password instead of root credentials, and update any
references (ConfigMap and Deployment) to use the new Secret key; also modify the
MySQL init SQL to create the bankapp_app user and grant only the necessary
privileges on the BankDB schema (no global privileges).
| name: mysql-pv | ||
| namespace: bankapp-namespace | ||
| spec: | ||
| capacity: | ||
| storage: 10Gi | ||
| volumeMode: Filesystem | ||
| accessModes: | ||
| - ReadWriteOnce | ||
| persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain # Keeps the PV after the PVC is deleted | ||
| storageClassName: standard # Make sure this matches your cluster's default storage class | ||
| hostPath: | ||
| path: /mnt/data/mysql |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
PersistentVolume cannot be namespaced. On Line 5 we add metadata.namespace, but PVs are cluster-scoped resources; applying this manifest will fail validation (unknown field "namespace"), so MySQL never gets storage. Please remove the namespace field:
metadata:
name: mysql-pv
- namespace: bankapp-namespace
spec:Keep the PVC in the namespace—just not the PV.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| name: mysql-pv | |
| namespace: bankapp-namespace | |
| spec: | |
| capacity: | |
| storage: 10Gi | |
| volumeMode: Filesystem | |
| accessModes: | |
| - ReadWriteOnce | |
| persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain # Keeps the PV after the PVC is deleted | |
| storageClassName: standard # Make sure this matches your cluster's default storage class | |
| hostPath: | |
| path: /mnt/data/mysql | |
| metadata: | |
| name: mysql-pv | |
| spec: | |
| capacity: | |
| storage: 10Gi | |
| volumeMode: Filesystem | |
| accessModes: | |
| - ReadWriteOnce | |
| persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Retain # Keeps the PV after the PVC is deleted | |
| storageClassName: standard # Make sure this matches your cluster's default storage class | |
| hostPath: | |
| path: /mnt/data/mysql |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In kubernetes/persistent-volume.yaml around lines 4 to 15, the PersistentVolume
manifest incorrectly includes a metadata.namespace field (PVs are
cluster-scoped); remove the namespace entry from the PV metadata so the manifest
validates, leaving only metadata.name (and other non-namespaced metadata) in
this file, and ensure the corresponding PersistentVolumeClaim remains in the
bankapp-namespace PVC manifest instead.
| ```bash | ||
| curl --silent --location -o /usr/local/bin/argocd https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/releases/download/v2.4.7/argocd-linux-amd64 | ||
| chmod +x /usr/local/bin/argocd | ||
| argocd version | ||
| ``` |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Update the Argo CD CLI instructions to the current release.
The README still instructs installing Argo CD CLI 2.4.7 (May 2022). That build predates v3.x, misses recent security fixes (for example CVE-2025-55190 patched on September 4, 2025), and is incompatible with current server features. Please bump the example to a maintained release (e.g., 3.1.3 as of Sept 4, 2025) and parameterize the version so the doc doesn’t drift again.
- curl --silent --location -o /usr/local/bin/argocd https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/releases/download/v2.4.7/argocd-linux-amd64
+ ARGOCD_VERSION="v3.1.3"
+ curl --silent --location -o /usr/local/bin/argocd "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/releases/download/${ARGOCD_VERSION}/argocd-linux-amd64"🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In kubernetes/README.md around lines 59 to 63 the Argo CD CLI install snippet
pins an old v2.4.7 release; update it to use a current maintained release (e.g.,
v3.1.3) and parameterize the version so it doesn’t drift. Replace the hardcoded
URL and filename with a variable (e.g., ARGOCD_VERSION) and reference that
variable in the curl and chmod steps, and update the example version shown by
argocd version — also mention using the correct binary for the detected OS/arch
if applicable.
| MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM= # Base64 for "Test@123" | ||
| SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM= # Base64 for "Test@123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Do not commit plaintext secrets. Keeping the real MySQL root password (Line 8) and Spring datasource password (Line 9) in Git—base64 or not—fully exposes your credentials and will leak through every clone. We need to strip the hard-coded values and source them from a secret manager or CI/CD injection instead. One minimal fix is to template the fields and feed them at deploy time, e.g.:
data:
- MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM=
- SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM=
+ MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD_B64}
+ SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: ${SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD_B64}(or drop the manifest and create it with kubectl create secret). Please rotate the leaked credentials as well.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM= # Base64 for "Test@123" | |
| SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM= # Base64 for "Test@123" | |
| data: | |
| MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD_B64} | |
| SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: ${SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD_B64} |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In kubernetes/secrets.yaml around lines 8-9, the file contains
hard-coded/base64-encoded passwords (MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD and
SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD); remove these literal secrets and replace them with
references that are injected at deploy time (e.g., template placeholders or
environment/Secret references populated by your CI/CD or secret manager) or omit
the manifest and create the secret at deploy time using kubectl/create-secret;
additionally, rotate the exposed credentials immediately and update any
consumers to use the new secret injection method.
| MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM= # Base64 for "Test@123" | ||
| SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: VGVzdEAxMjM= # Base64 for "Test@123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Remove committed database credentials immediately
Both entries decode to Test@123, so this manifest is checking real MySQL and Spring datasource passwords into git. That’s equivalent to publishing them in plaintext: anyone with repo access (or fork history) can use them, which is a critical security leak. Treat these secrets as compromised, rotate the database credentials, and replace this manifest with a secure mechanism (e.g., sealed secrets or external secret injection) or, at minimum, placeholder values populated via your CI/CD secret store.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In secrets.yaml lines 8-9, two Base64-encoded real passwords were committed;
remove the encoded values and replace them with non-functional placeholders
(e.g., "REDACTED" or empty strings), then stop committing secrets: convert this
manifest to reference an external secret store or sealed secret (implement
sealed-secrets/ExternalSecret/secretManager reference) and update
deployment/helm manifests to load credentials from that secret provider;
immediately rotate/replace the compromised DB and Spring datasource credentials
in the actual systems, revoke the old credentials, and update CI/CD to inject
the new secrets at deploy time; finally purge the sensitive values from Git
history using git filter-repo or BFG and force-push the cleaned history, and add
secret-scanning/pre-commit rules to prevent future commits.
| th:classappend="${transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit'} ? 'text-success' : 'text-danger'"> | ||
| <span th:text="${transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit'} ? '+$' + transaction.amount : '-$' + transaction.amount"></span> |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Guard against null transaction types before calling contains
On Line 116 you now call transaction.type.contains(...). If transaction.type ever comes back null (e.g., incomplete row, bad data), Thymeleaf will throw a runtime exception and break page rendering. Please add a null guard before invoking contains.
- th:classappend="${transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit'} ? 'text-success' : 'text-danger'">
- <span th:text="${transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit'} ? '+$' + transaction.amount : '-$' + transaction.amount"></span>
+ th:classappend="${transaction.type != null && (transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit')} ? 'text-success' : 'text-danger'">
+ <span th:text="${transaction.type != null && (transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit')} ? '+$' + transaction.amount : '-$' + transaction.amount"></span>📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| th:classappend="${transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit'} ? 'text-success' : 'text-danger'"> | |
| <span th:text="${transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit'} ? '+$' + transaction.amount : '-$' + transaction.amount"></span> | |
| th:classappend="${transaction.type != null && (transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit')} ? 'text-success' : 'text-danger'"> | |
| <span th:text="${transaction.type != null && (transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') || transaction.type == 'Deposit')} ? '+$' + transaction.amount : '-$' + transaction.amount"></span> |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In src/main/resources/templates/transactions.html around lines 116 to 117, the
template calls transaction.type.contains(...) without checking for null which
can throw at runtime; add a null guard so you only call contains when
transaction.type != null (e.g., change the ternary conditions to check
transaction.type != null && transaction.type.contains('Transfer In') or
transaction.type == 'Deposit') and apply the same null-safe check to both
th:classappend and th:text expressions so the page won't break on null/invalid
types.
| ingress { | ||
| description = "port 22 allow" | ||
| from_port = 22 | ||
| to_port = 22 | ||
| protocol = "tcp" | ||
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| egress { | ||
| description = " allow all outgoing traffic " | ||
| from_port = 0 | ||
| to_port = 0 | ||
| protocol = "-1" | ||
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| ingress { | ||
| description = "port 80 allow" | ||
| from_port = 80 | ||
| to_port = 80 | ||
| protocol = "tcp" | ||
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| ingress { | ||
| description = "port 443 allow" | ||
| from_port = 443 | ||
| to_port = 443 | ||
| protocol = "tcp" | ||
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Lock down SSH ingress.
Allowing port 22 from 0.0.0.0/0 makes every internet host a potential brute-force source against this EC2 instance. Please restrict SSH to the team’s bastion or office CIDRs (or remove it entirely and rely on SSM Session Manager). Leaving SSH wide open is a blocker for production infrastructure.
- cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]
+ cidr_blocks = [var.admin_cidr] # e.g., your bastion IP block📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| ingress { | |
| description = "port 22 allow" | |
| from_port = 22 | |
| to_port = 22 | |
| protocol = "tcp" | |
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | |
| } | |
| egress { | |
| description = " allow all outgoing traffic " | |
| from_port = 0 | |
| to_port = 0 | |
| protocol = "-1" | |
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | |
| } | |
| ingress { | |
| description = "port 80 allow" | |
| from_port = 80 | |
| to_port = 80 | |
| protocol = "tcp" | |
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | |
| } | |
| ingress { | |
| description = "port 443 allow" | |
| from_port = 443 | |
| to_port = 443 | |
| protocol = "tcp" | |
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | |
| } | |
| ingress { | |
| description = "port 22 allow" | |
| from_port = 22 | |
| to_port = 22 | |
| protocol = "tcp" | |
| cidr_blocks = [var.admin_cidr] # e.g., your bastion IP block | |
| } | |
| egress { | |
| description = " allow all outgoing traffic " | |
| from_port = 0 | |
| to_port = 0 | |
| protocol = "-1" | |
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | |
| } | |
| ingress { | |
| description = "port 80 allow" | |
| from_port = 80 | |
| to_port = 80 | |
| protocol = "tcp" | |
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | |
| } | |
| ingress { | |
| description = "port 443 allow" | |
| from_port = 443 | |
| to_port = 443 | |
| protocol = "tcp" | |
| cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] | |
| } |
| resource "aws_instance" "testinstance" { | ||
| ami = data.aws_ami.os_image.id | ||
| instance_type = "t2.medium" | ||
| key_name = aws_key_pair.deployer.key_name | ||
| security_groups = [aws_security_group.allow_user_to_connect.name] | ||
| tags = { | ||
| Name = "bankapp-automate-instance" | ||
| } | ||
| root_block_device { | ||
| volume_size = 27 | ||
| volume_type = "gp3" | ||
| } | ||
| # connection { | ||
| # type = "ssh" | ||
| # user = "ubuntu" | ||
| # private_key = file("terra-key") | ||
| # host = self.public_ip | ||
| # } | ||
|
|
||
| # provisioner "remote-exec" { | ||
| # inline = [ | ||
| # "sudo apt update -y", | ||
| # "sudo apt install -y apache2", | ||
| # "sudo systemctl start apache2", | ||
| # "sudo systemctl enable apache2", | ||
| # "echo 'Hello from Terraform Provisioners!' | sudo tee /var/www/html/index.html" | ||
| # ] | ||
| # } | ||
| } |
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Require IMDSv2 on the instance.
The instance currently uses the AWS defaults, which still permit IMDSv1. That exposes you to SSRF-style metadata theft. Please enforce IMDSv2 (and ideally enable instance metadata tags) via metadata_options.
resource "aws_instance" "testinstance" {
ami = data.aws_ami.os_image.id
instance_type = "t2.medium"
key_name = aws_key_pair.deployer.key_name
security_groups = [aws_security_group.allow_user_to_connect.name]
+ metadata_options {
+ http_tokens = "required"
+ http_endpoint = "enabled"
+ }📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| resource "aws_instance" "testinstance" { | |
| ami = data.aws_ami.os_image.id | |
| instance_type = "t2.medium" | |
| key_name = aws_key_pair.deployer.key_name | |
| security_groups = [aws_security_group.allow_user_to_connect.name] | |
| tags = { | |
| Name = "bankapp-automate-instance" | |
| } | |
| root_block_device { | |
| volume_size = 27 | |
| volume_type = "gp3" | |
| } | |
| # connection { | |
| # type = "ssh" | |
| # user = "ubuntu" | |
| # private_key = file("terra-key") | |
| # host = self.public_ip | |
| # } | |
| # provisioner "remote-exec" { | |
| # inline = [ | |
| # "sudo apt update -y", | |
| # "sudo apt install -y apache2", | |
| # "sudo systemctl start apache2", | |
| # "sudo systemctl enable apache2", | |
| # "echo 'Hello from Terraform Provisioners!' | sudo tee /var/www/html/index.html" | |
| # ] | |
| # } | |
| } | |
| resource "aws_instance" "testinstance" { | |
| ami = data.aws_ami.os_image.id | |
| instance_type = "t2.medium" | |
| key_name = aws_key_pair.deployer.key_name | |
| security_groups = [aws_security_group.allow_user_to_connect.name] | |
| metadata_options { | |
| http_tokens = "required" | |
| http_endpoint = "enabled" | |
| } | |
| tags = { | |
| Name = "bankapp-automate-instance" | |
| } | |
| root_block_device { | |
| volume_size = 27 | |
| volume_type = "gp3" | |
| } | |
| # connection { | |
| # type = "ssh" | |
| # user = "ubuntu" | |
| # private_key = file("terra-key") | |
| # host = self.public_ip | |
| # } | |
| # provisioner "remote-exec" { | |
| # inline = [ | |
| # "sudo apt update -y", | |
| # "sudo apt install -y apache2", | |
| # "sudo systemctl start apache2", | |
| # "sudo systemctl enable apache2", | |
| # "echo 'Hello from Terraform Provisioners!' | sudo tee /var/www/html/index.html" | |
| # ] | |
| # } | |
| } |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Checkov (3.2.334)
[medium] 65-93: Ensure that detailed monitoring is enabled for EC2 instances
(CKV_AWS_126)
[high] 65-93: Ensure Instance Metadata Service Version 1 is not enabled
(CKV_AWS_79)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In terraform/ec2.tf around lines 65 to 93, the aws_instance resource does not
set metadata_options so IMDSv1 remains allowed; add a metadata_options block to
require IMDSv2 and enable instance metadata tags. Specifically, add
metadata_options { http_tokens = "required" http_endpoint = "enabled"
http_put_response_hop_limit = 1 instance_metadata_tags = "enabled" } inside the
aws_instance resource to enforce IMDSv2 and allow instance tags to be available
via the metadata service.
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Nitpick comments (5)
Jenkinsfile (5)
26-26: Hardcoded repository URL and branch reduce flexibility.The repository URL and branch name are hardcoded, which limits reusability and makes it difficult to test the pipeline with different branches or forks.
Consider parameterizing these values:
parameters { string(name: 'DOCKER_TAG', defaultValue: '', description: 'Setting docker image for latest push') + string(name: 'GIT_REPO_URL', defaultValue: 'https://github.com/LondheShubham153/Springboot-BankApp.git', description: 'Git repository URL') + string(name: 'GIT_BRANCH', defaultValue: 'DevOps', description: 'Git branch to checkout') }Then update the checkout stage:
- code_checkout("https://github.com/LondheShubham153/Springboot-BankApp.git","DevOps") + code_checkout("${params.GIT_REPO_URL}","${params.GIT_BRANCH}")
50-50: Hardcoded SonarQube parameters limit reusability.The SonarQube tool name (
"Sonar"), project key ("bankapp"), and project name ("bankapp") are hardcoded, which reduces the pipeline's reusability across different projects.Consider parameterizing these values or deriving them from environment variables if you plan to reuse this pipeline for multiple projects.
66-66: Hardcoded DockerHub username should be parameterized.The DockerHub username
"madhupdevops"is hardcoded in both the build and push stages. This reduces flexibility and makes the pipeline less portable.Consider adding a parameter or environment variable:
environment{ SONAR_HOME = tool "Sonar" + DOCKER_REGISTRY_USER = "madhupdevops" }Then update the stages:
- docker_build("bankapp","${params.DOCKER_TAG}","madhupdevops") + docker_build("bankapp","${params.DOCKER_TAG}","${env.DOCKER_REGISTRY_USER}")- docker_push("bankapp","${params.DOCKER_TAG}","madhupdevops") + docker_push("bankapp","${params.DOCKER_TAG}","${env.DOCKER_REGISTRY_USER}")Also applies to: 74-74
13-87: Consider adding timeout configurations to prevent hung builds.The pipeline lacks timeout configurations. Long-running stages (especially security scans like OWASP and Trivy) could cause builds to hang indefinitely.
Add a global timeout or per-stage timeouts:
pipeline { agent any + + options { + timeout(time: 60, unit: 'MINUTES') + timestamps() + buildDiscarder(logRotator(numToKeepStr: '10')) + } environment{
79-86: Missing failure and cleanup handling.The pipeline only defines a
successblock in the post section. Consider addingfailure,always, orcleanupblocks to handle error scenarios, send notifications, or perform cleanup tasks.Add comprehensive post-build actions:
post{ success{ archiveArtifacts artifacts: '*.xml', followSymlinks: false build job: "BankApp-CD", parameters: [ string(name: 'DOCKER_TAG', value: "${params.DOCKER_TAG}") ] } + failure{ + echo 'Pipeline failed. Please check the logs.' + // Add notification logic here (email, Slack, etc.) + } + always{ + cleanWs() + } }
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Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
Jenkinsfile(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (2)
Jenkinsfile (2)
82-84: Verify downstream job configuration. Ensure the Jenkins jobBankApp-CDexists and is configured to accept theDOCKER_TAGparameter (Jenkinsfile, lines 82–84).
1-1: ConfirmSharedlibrary functions are available
I couldn’t locate definitions forcode_checkout,trivy_scan,owasp_dependency,sonarqube_analysis,sonarqube_code_quality,docker_build, ordocker_pushin this repo—please ensure theSharedlibrary is configured in Jenkins with these implementations and tests.
| } | ||
|
|
||
| parameters { | ||
| string(name: 'DOCKER_TAG', defaultValue: '', description: 'Setting docker image for latest push') |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Empty default value for DOCKER_TAG may cause issues.
The DOCKER_TAG parameter has an empty default value. If a build is triggered without explicitly setting this parameter, it will result in invalid Docker image tags like bankapp: (missing the tag portion).
Consider providing a sensible default value or making it required:
parameters {
- string(name: 'DOCKER_TAG', defaultValue: '', description: 'Setting docker image for latest push')
+ string(name: 'DOCKER_TAG', defaultValue: 'latest', description: 'Setting docker image for latest push')
}Alternatively, use a dynamic default based on build metadata:
parameters {
- string(name: 'DOCKER_TAG', defaultValue: '', description: 'Setting docker image for latest push')
+ string(name: 'DOCKER_TAG', defaultValue: "${env.BUILD_NUMBER}", description: 'Setting docker image for latest push')
}🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In Jenkinsfile around line 10, the DOCKER_TAG parameter is defined with an empty
default which can produce invalid image names (e.g. bankapp:); change the
parameter to provide a sensible default (for example defaultValue: 'latest' or a
dynamic default like "build-${env.BUILD_NUMBER}" or a short git SHA) or make the
parameter required/validated so that builds always produce a valid Docker tag;
update the string(...) declaration accordingly and/or add validation logic
before tagging/pushing images.
| } | ||
| post{ | ||
| success{ | ||
| archiveArtifacts artifacts: '*.xml', followSymlinks: false |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🧩 Analysis chain
Wildcard artifact pattern may capture unintended files.
The pattern *.xml will archive all XML files in the workspace root, which might include unexpected files from dependencies, build tools, or security scans.
Verify which XML files are actually generated by your build process. Consider being more specific about which artifacts to archive (e.g., target/surefire-reports/*.xml for test reports, dependency-check-report.xml for OWASP reports).
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Search for XML file generation in the repository
# Look for common locations where XML reports might be generated
fd -e xml -t f . | head -20Length of output: 7
In Jenkinsfile line 81, use explicit artifact paths instead of *.xml
*.xml matches only XML files in the workspace root (currently just pom.xml), so you’ll end up archiving your POM unintentionally. Update to specific patterns, for example:
archiveArtifacts artifacts: 'target/surefire-reports/*.xml', followSymlinks: falsearchiveArtifacts artifacts: 'dependency-check-report.xml', followSymlinks: false
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In Jenkinsfile around line 81, the artifact archiving uses a broad '*.xml' which
only matches root XMLs (like pom.xml) and archives the wrong files; replace this
with explicit artifact paths (e.g. target/surefire-reports/*.xml for test
reports and dependency-check-report.xml or the correct report path) or a
comma-separated list of exact patterns so only intended reports are archived,
and keep followSymlinks: false.
2 participants
Summary by CodeRabbit