π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix command injection in SSH cwd handling#785
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix command injection in SSH cwd handling#785
Conversation
Secured `SshConnection::build_command` by applying `shell_escape` to the `cwd` parameter before string interpolation. This prevents attackers from injecting arbitrary shell commands via the `chdir` module parameter. Added a regression test `test_build_command_with_malicious_cwd` to verify that malicious paths are properly escaped. Co-authored-by: dolagoartur <146357947+dolagoartur@users.noreply.github.com>
|
π Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a π emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Command Injection in SSH connection handling
π― Impact: Attackers could execute arbitrary commands on remote hosts by supplying a malicious
chdirpath (e.g.,/tmp; rm -rf /) to any module.π§ Fix: Applied
shell_escapeto thecwdparameter inSshConnection::build_command.β Verification: Added unit test confirming that
cwdwith shell metacharacters is now safely quoted.PR created automatically by Jules for task 14799054732574871731 started by @dolagoartur