Skip to content
Open
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions docs/CSBR.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2031,6 +2031,8 @@ Subscribers and Signing Services MAY sign Code at any point in the development o

The validity period for a Code Signing Certificate issued to a Subscriber or Signing Service MUST NOT exceed 39 months.

For all Code Signing Certificates issued after June 15, 2025, the validity period for the Code Signing Certificate issued to a Subscriber MUST NOT exceed 460 days.
Copy link
Member

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

@ianjmcm We discussed this over at the CSCWG today. I'd like to suggest merging line 2032 and 2034 into one:

The validity period for a Code Signing Certificate issued to a Subscriber MUST NOT exceed 39 months. For all Code Signing Certificates issued issued to a Subscriber after June 15, 2025, the validity period MUST NOT exceed 460 days.


The Timestamp Certificate validity period MUST NOT exceed 135 months. The Timestamp Certificate Key Pair MUST meet the requirements in [Section 6.1.5](#615-key-sizes). The CA or Timestamp Authority SHALL NOT use a Private Key associated with a Timestamp Certificate more than 15 months after the `notBefore` date of a Timestamp Certificate.

Effective April 15, 2025, Private Keys associated with Timestamp Certificates issued for greater than 15 months MUST be removed from the Hardware Crypto Module protecting the Private Key within 18 months after issuance of the Timestamp Certificate. For Timestamp Certificates issued on or after June 1, 2024, the CA SHALL log the removal of the Private Key from the Hardware Crypto Module through means of a key deletion ceremony performed by the CA and witnessed and signed-off by at least two Trusted Role members. The CA MAY also perform a key destruction ceremony, meaning that all copies of that private key are unequivocally/securely destroyed (i.e. without a way to recover the key), including any instance of the key as part of a backup, to satisfy this requirement.
Expand Down