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Complete transformation into a production-ready enterprise platform: **API Gateway (Fastify 4 + TypeScript)** - OpenClaw universal AI agent orchestrator with smooth weighted round-robin load balancing - Domain-Driven Design: domain → application → infrastructure → interface layers - Enterprise auth: TOTP 2FA (otplib), httpOnly JWT cookies, scrypt password hashing - Immutable audit log with SHA-256 cryptographic fingerprint chaining - Adaptive rate limiting with exponential backoff (SQLite-backed sliding windows) - AES-256-GCM encryption for Kilo Code API keys at rest - Docker container management via Docker CLI wrapper - WebSocket terminal with security allowlist - Kilo Code bridge API (proxy with encrypted credentials) - SQLite WAL-mode persistence with schema migrations **Next.js 15 Admin Dashboard (App Router)** - Login with TOTP step-up flow - Agent CRUD with OpenClaw dispatch testing - Real-time audit log with chain integrity indicator - Docker container/image management - WebSocket terminal UI - Kilo Code configuration and TOTP/password settings **Testing (Vitest)** - 85 gateway tests passing (10 files: unit + integration) - 26 dashboard tests passing (2 files: lib/utils + lib/api) - Coverage: gateway 83.6% lines/83.6% stmts/82.2% fns/86.6% branches (all ≥80%) - Coverage: dashboard 97.3% lines/97.3% stmts/85.7% fns/80.6% branches (all ≥70%) - Integration tests use in-memory SQLite with pool:forks isolation **Infrastructure** - pnpm workspaces monorepo (apps/*, services/*, packages/*) - Shared TypeScript types package (@peanut/shared-types) - GitHub Actions CI pipeline (type-check, test, build, docker, security-audit) - Docker Compose for local development https://claude.ai/code/session_01LCd1PF4LVsQDY4uAWzsm1i
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| const envArgs = Object.entries(dto.env ?? {}) | ||
| .map(([k, v]) => `-e "${k.replace(/"/g, '')}=${v.replace(/"/g, '')}"`) |
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WARNING: La sanitización de variables de entorno es insuficiente. El reemplazo replace(/"/g, '') puede ser bypassed con técnicas de inyección de comandos usando backticks, $() u otras técnicas de shell.
Considera usar una librería de escape apropiada o pasar las variables de entorno de forma segura sin interpolación de strings.
| .join(' '); | ||
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| const volumeArgs = (dto.volumes ?? []) | ||
| .map(v => `-v "${v.replace(/"/g, '')}"`) |
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WARNING: La sanitización de volúmenes es insuficiente. El reemplazo replace(/"/g, '') no previene inyección de comandos usando otros caracteres shell.
Considera validar el path contra un allowlist o usar path traversal checks más robustos.
| exp: Date.now() + 10 * 60 * 1000, | ||
| nonce: randomBytes(8).toString('hex'), | ||
| }; | ||
| return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url'); |
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CRITICAL: El token temporal no está firmado - cualquiera puede modificarlo. El uso de base64url sin firma permite que un atacante modifique el userId o extienda la expiración.
Considera usar JWT firmados o HMAC para el temp token.
| 'git', 'node', 'python3', 'pip', | ||
| ]); | ||
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| const FORBIDDEN_PATTERNS = /\b(rm|rmdir|dd|mkfs|fdisk|format|kill|killall|shutdown|reboot|halt|sudo|su|chmod|chown|passwd|crontab|systemctl|service)\b/; |
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WARNING: El patrón FORBIDDEN_PATTERNS usa word boundaries que pueden ser bypassed. Además, el spawn de /bin/sh sin sandboxing permite ejecución arbitraria si se bypassan los filtros.
| email: user.email, | ||
| role: user.role, | ||
| totpVerified: false, | ||
| sessionId: Math.random().toString(36).slice(2), |
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WARNING: Math.random() no es criptográficamente seguro para generar session IDs. Considera usar crypto.randomBytes() o crypto.randomUUID().
| email: user.email, | ||
| role: user.role, | ||
| totpVerified: true, | ||
| sessionId: Math.random().toString(36).slice(2), |
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WARNING: Math.random() no es criptográficamente seguro para generar session IDs. Considera usar crypto.randomBytes() o crypto.randomUUID().
| await authService.createUser( | ||
| 'admin@peanut.local', | ||
| 'Administrator', | ||
| process.env['DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD'] ?? 'PeanutAdmin@2024!', |
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WARNING: La contraseña por defecto tiene fallback hardcodeado. Si DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD no está seteado, se usa una contraseña conocida. Considera requerir explícitamente la variable de entorno.
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| // Clean old windows | ||
| const cutoff = new Date(now - cfg.windowMs * 10).toISOString(); | ||
| db.prepare('DELETE FROM rate_limit_windows WHERE window_start < ?').run(cutoff); |
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SUGGESTION: La limpieza de ventanas antiguas corre en cada request. Para alto tráfico, considera usar un job programado o TTL nativo de la base de datos.
| if (!_db) { | ||
| const DATA_DIR = process.env['DATA_DIR'] ?? join(process.cwd(), 'data'); | ||
| const dbPath = DATA_DIR === ':memory:' ? ':memory:' : join(DATA_DIR, 'gateway.db'); | ||
| if (DATA_DIR !== ':memory:') mkdirSync(DATA_DIR, { recursive: true }); |
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SUGGESTION: La base de datos SQLite usa modo WAL que puede no ser apropiado para todos los entornos de deployment. Considera documentar esta elección.
Code Review SummaryStatus: 9 Issues Found | Recommendation: Address before merge Overview
Issue Details (click to expand)CRITICAL
WARNING
SUGGESTION
Other Observations (not in diff)Issues found in unchanged code that cannot receive inline comments:
Files Reviewed (40+ files)
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| const url = path.startsWith('/api/gateway') | ||
| ? path // Next.js rewrite proxy | ||
| : `${API_BASE}/api/v1${path}`; |
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This helper builds an absolute gateway URL for normal paths, so server-side calls like getSession() in src/lib/auth.ts hit the gateway directly instead of the Next rewrite path; in that context the incoming auth_token cookie is not forwarded, so authenticated users are treated as logged out (and in containerized deploys localhost:3001 also points at the dashboard container, not the gateway). Route server-side requests through /api/gateway/... or explicitly forward request cookies.
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| exp: Date.now() + 10 * 60 * 1000, | ||
| nonce: randomBytes(8).toString('hex'), | ||
| }; | ||
| return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url'); |
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The temporary token is just base64url-encoded JSON and validateTempToken only decodes/parses it, so clients can forge {sub, exp} values without first completing password authentication. That lets an attacker bypass the password step for any TOTP-enabled account if they obtain a valid TOTP/backup code; this flow should use a signed token (JWT/HMAC) and verify signature and expiry before accepting sub.
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| async startContainer(containerId: string, actorId: string, actorEmail: string): Promise<void> { | ||
| await this.runDockerCommand(`docker start ${containerId}`); |
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This command interpolates containerId directly into a shell string passed to exec, and the route params feeding it are not constrained to safe Docker ID/name characters. An authenticated operator can supply shell metacharacters in :id and trigger arbitrary host command execution; validate IDs with a strict regex and execute docker with argv-based APIs instead of a shell command string.
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2 participants
Complete transformation into a production-ready enterprise platform:
API Gateway (Fastify 4 + TypeScript)
Next.js 15 Admin Dashboard (App Router)
Testing (Vitest)
Infrastructure
https://claude.ai/code/session_01LCd1PF4LVsQDY4uAWzsm1i